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Hands rose up from the grave to grasp each cofﬁ n, as if the dead were welcoming 
the remains of the genocide victims. The simple wooden boxes contained bones 
recovered from mass graves and pit latrines so that they could be re-interred 
during ceremonies marking the tenth anniversary of  the Rwanda genocide. 
It was 7 April 2004 in Kigali, and a gaggle of television crews, reporters and 
photographers jostled for space around a concrete tomb where victims of the 
1994 genocide were ﬁ nally being given a digniﬁ ed burial. Earlier, pall bearers 
had descended into the crypt, climbing down a ladder so they could be in place 
to receive the cofﬁ ns. The boxes were gingerly passed one by one into their ﬁ nal 
resting place at Rwanda’s national memorial to the 1994 slaughter.
Ten years after the genocide, Rwanda was still burying its dead and represent-
atives of the international media were there, watching. Heading the dignitaries 
assembled to take part in the ceremony was Paul Kagame, president of Rwanda 
and in 1994, leader of the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front, which 
ended the genocide and took over the country. Retired Canadian General 
Roméo Dallaire, who led the ill-fated United Nations mission to Rwanda during 
the catastrophe, joined Kagame at the ceremony.
Both Kagame and Dallaire could have been forgiven for asking a pointed 
question as they regarded the international media throng gathered for the 
ceremonies: where were the world’s media a decade earlier when a campaign 
to exterminate the Tutsi minority and Hutu moderates resulted in the massacre 
of more than 800,000 innocents?
In hindsight, the media shorthand for the Rwanda genocide goes something 
like this: the world community failed to intervene and abandoned Rwanda while 
dead bodies clogged the rivers and piled up on roadsides. These events were 
reported by the news media, but not very prominently. When the media ﬁ nally 
descended on the story, it was to cover the cholera epidemic in refugee camps 
across the border in Zaire, camps populated by Hutu who ﬂ ed Rwanda at the 
tail end of the genocide.
Looking back, it is easy to see what the news media did wrong, both inside 
Rwanda and without. Many journalists within Rwanda were implicated in 
the killing. Hate media were instrumental in the extermination campaign. 
International news media misconstrued or downplayed the Rwanda story. 
 433 
434 AFTER THE GENOCIDE AND THE WAY FORWARD
Political ﬁ gures, such as US President Bill Clinton (1998), later claimed that 
they did not have enough information to fully grasp what was going on in 
Rwanda. More likely, because the public was not very engaged by the Rwanda 
story, there was little pressure for leaders to do anything.
This collection of papers set out to examine the role of the news media in 
the 1994 catastrophe, inside and outside Rwanda. More than a decade later, 
are we any wiser? What has changed and what have we learned from what went 
wrong? In part, the answer lies in Darfur, the region in western Sudan widely 
acknowledged in early 2006 to be a humanitarian and human rights tragedy 
of the ﬁ rst order. By some accounts, as many as 5,000 people continued to die 
each month in a deteriorating situation of massive atrocities against civilians, 
blamed primarily on the government and its allied Janjaweed militias. 
In the face of  reliable accounts of  what is at best ethnic cleansing and at 
worst genocide – a situation that some have described as Rwanda in slow 
motion – the world community did little. By most accounts, North American 
media have drastically underplayed the situation in western Sudan, just as 
they did in Rwanda, despite evidence of massive violations of human rights 
and a government supporting forces wreaking havoc on innocent civilians. 
Perhaps, just perhaps, content analysis would demonstrate that Darfur has 
registered on the media radar screen to a greater degree than did Rwanda. But 
it has not become a mega-story, or a media sensation. It has not captured our 
imaginations. And that signals, once again, a media failure.
For what it’s worth, the international community has shown a measure of 
contrition with regard to the events of  1994. Rwanda is now a synonym for 
the world community’s failure to intervene in the face of gross violations of 
human rights, a genocide. Rwanda is invoked repeatedly, often in sentences 
that contain the phrase ‘never again.’ Key ﬁ gures in the Rwandan drama have 
apologized, or at least expressed regret, for their failure to act to the best of their 
abilities.1 And in large part because of Rwanda, a new paradigm emerged and 
eventually won formal recognition on the world stage. The Canadian-inspired 
doctrine called The Responsibility to Protect (ICISS 2001) was formally adopted 
by the United Nations in September 2005. (Whether it is ever put into force is 
another matter.) The doctrine was set out in the December 2001 report of the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. It overturns 
the notion of absolute national sovereignty when it comes to massive violations 
of  human rights and genocide, marking the ﬁ rst time that state sovereignty 
and non-interference in internal affairs have been qualiﬁ ed. In effect, the UN 
declaration enshrines in international law the notion that the world community 
has a right to intervene – a responsibility to protect – to stop a government 
from massive violation of the human rights of its citizens. 
But the document is virtually silent on the role of the news media, and there is 
little discussion of the part journalists and news organizations could or should 
play in the face of the kind of atrocities witnessed in Rwanda. All these years 
later, we don’t yet seem to have ﬁ gured out that part of the puzzle. Perhaps it is 
time to advance a new paradigm for journalists: the responsibility to report. If we 
cannot adequately address the kind of structural constraints that handicapped 
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the media in the case of  Rwanda, at least we can deal with the behavioural 
aspects of the media – the way individual journalists conduct themselves. 
In the years since 1994, Rwanda has become a case study in hate media, a 
textbook example of how journalism and particularly the broadcast media can 
be perverted in the name of hate. And, since Rwanda, considerable attention 
has been devoted to deﬁ ning how monitoring the media in zones of actual or 
potential conﬂ ict can help policymakers to grasp more accurately what is going 
on and to use that information to frame responses with the best chance of 
preventing or mitigating violence. In Britain, the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Ofﬁ ce (FCO) and BBC Monitoring (BBCM) have established a specialized 
‘tension and hate speech monitoring’ project. BBCM aims to track the world’s 
media for its clients (four main stakeholders: the BBC World Service, the 
FCO, the Ministry of Defence and the Cabinet Ofﬁ ce). BBCM also has a 50-
year old partnership with the Foreign Broadcast Information Service in the 
United States. In August 2002, BBCM began intensively monitoring media 
in 15 countries of interest, then providing monthly transcripts. A small-scale 
project, begun in September 2003, involved a focus on media and hate speech 
and incitement in the former Soviet Union, Israel–Palestine, Kosovo, Albania 
and Côte d’Ivoire.2
Clearly, media monitoring for hate speech has taken on a high proﬁ le because 
of Rwanda. As one observer quipped, we are all now well prepared to stop the 
Rwanda genocide – ten years too late.3 And yet, what are the chances of once 
again coming across such a textbook example of hate media and incitement 
as Rwanda? We should probably be focused on media interventions that come 
much earlier in the trajectory that culminates in hate media. In fact, rather than 
using monitoring reports to try and shut down media outlets, a more useful 
exercise would be to use the material to design programmes to improve media 
standards, conduct media training and develop codes of conduct for journalists 
– behavioural rather than structural solutions. 
More than a decade after the genocide, the media sector in Rwanda is still 
in need of this kind of assistance with training and development. There was 
no school of journalism in Rwanda until the late 1990s. Before the genocide, 
Rwanda’s journalists were either professionally trained outside the country or 
trained ‘on the job’, in some cases with seminars and workshops to improve 
their skills. The School of  Journalism and Communication was founded in 
1996 at the National University of Rwanda in Butare. In early 2006, Carleton 
University’s School of Journalism and Communication launched a collaborative 
effort with its counterpart in Butare to work together on stafﬁ ng and curriculum 
development through a project called The Rwanda Initiative. 
But efforts to foster a more professional media sector in Rwanda come 
at a time when respect for human rights and press freedom in the country 
is a genuine cause for concern. Major human rights organizations, such as 
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have been highly critical of 
the Kagame government’s treatment of  human rights organizations and the 
news media. The government has been accused of an intimidation campaign 
that prompted Rwanda’s primary human rights organization, LIPRODHOR, 
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to close its doors in early 2005 (AI 2005). Amnesty International accused the 
Rwandan government of ‘inappropriately manipulating the concept of genocide 
to silence not only organizations and individuals critical of  the government 
but organizations who have a close relationship with the Rwandese people and 
whose loyalty the government questions’ (AI 2004a). And in November 2004, 
Amnesty International urged the government of Rwanda to do its utmost to 
foster the independence of the press and to refrain from using the law to repress 
journalistic activities (AI 2004b). Reporters Without Borders went so far as to 
label President Kagame an enemy of press freedom. More than a decade after 
a genocide that deeply implicated the news media, there are still lessons to be 
learned in Rwanda.
What lessons have the international media drawn from the debacle of Rwanda? 
Like other international actors, the news media have been slow to acknowledge 
their failures during the genocide. Journalists tend to look forward, not back. 
For that reason, it took nearly 60 years for The New York Times to come to terms 
with the impact of its coverage of the Nazi Holocaust. In a 14 November 2001 
feature headed ‘Turning Away From the Holocaust,’ former Times executive 
editor Max Frankel described the inﬂ uential newspaper’s ‘staggering, stunning 
failure’ to properly depict Hitler’s methodical extermination of  the Jews of 
Europe. Frankel noted that only six times in nearly six years did the front page 
of the Times mention Jews as Hitler’s unique target for total annihilation. Sound 
familiar? The belated media mea culpa about coverage of the Holocaust has 
not been replicated when it comes to Rwanda, despite all the evidence of an 
abysmal media failure.
Instead, history continues to repeat itself. Stories like Rwanda continue to 
be downplayed. Year after year, the international news media devote less and 
less attention to foreign affairs, with the exception of  the ‘big’ stories, such 
as the war in Iraq, the war on terror or the disaster du jour. Claude Moisy, 
former chairman and general manager of Agence France-Presse, described an 
inescapable paradox that ‘the amazing increase in the capacity to produce and 
distribute news from distant lands has been met by an obvious decrease in its 
consumption’ (Moisy 1997). Writing in the late 1990s, Moisy described a clear 
pattern: with the exception of a surge of international coverage in 1990 and 1991 
due to the ﬁ rst Gulf War, the number and length of foreign topics covered in 
the evening news had declined far below Cold War levels. In early 2006, chances 
are that a rigorous content analysis would show, pound for pound, a signiﬁ cant 
up-tick in media coverage of foreign affairs. But factor out the overwhelming 
focus on Iraq and we are almost certainly looking at a continuation of the trend 
away from media coverage of international affairs. 
Once again, journalists and critics cite a number of  factors affecting the 
limited coverage of  Darfur: the difﬁ culty of  getting into the region, tight 
budgets, the news focus on the war in Iraq and the presumed lack of audience 
interest in Africa (Ricchiardi 2005). For example, one researcher calculated 
that the nightly newscasts of ABC, CBS and NBC devote a total of roughly 
24,900 minutes to news each year – an average of 20 minutes of news in each of 
these newscasts every night. In 2004, all three networks combined aired a total 
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of only 26 minutes on ﬁ ghting in Sudan, which has been described by some 
as genocide. (ABC devoted 18 minutes to Darfur coverage, NBC 5 and CBS 
only 3.) By contrast, houseware maven Martha Stewart’s legal woes garnered 
130 minutes of nightly news coverage (Tyndall Report 2004). More recently, a 
quantitative monitoring of all news segments aired in June 2005 on ABC, CBS, 
NBC, CNN, FoxNews and MSNBC demonstrated that coverage of  Darfur 
was overshadowed by reporting on the so-called ‘runaway bride’ (the Georgia 
woman who drove across the country and concocted a fake kidnapping to escape 
her wedding in April 2005), the Michael Jackson trial and Tom Cruise’s new 
movie and relationship with actress Katie Holmes.4
The shocking thing about these ﬁ ndings is that they no longer shock us. They 
haven’t shocked us for a long time. In fact, we now take this kind of  media 
coverage for granted. There is a vast academic literature on media coverage of 
international affairs and more speciﬁ cally, coverage of Africa and the developing 
world. Some go at this empirically, with an eye to ﬁ guring out what the news 
media are actually doing. Others take a normative approach, prescribing what 
the media and journalists should do. We need more of both lines of enquiry.
But the problem with media prescriptions is that they are often so general 
that they are beyond implementation. In essence, the prescriptions end up being 
variants on the symptoms: news organizations should devote more resources 
to coverage of Africa and the developing world; the media should train more 
professionals in coverage of  conﬂ ict and development issues; news from the 
developing world should be given more prominence on news pages and in 
broadcasts; news organizations should deploy more full-time foreign corre-
spondents; rather than just covering wars, the media should pay more attention 
before a conﬂ ict erupts and after the fact, examine efforts at conﬂ ict resolution 
and ways the news media could actually support reconciliation and peace (for 
examples of this prescriptive approach, see Carnegie Commission 1997: 121–3 
and Manoff 1997).
All of these prescriptions are really just reworded descriptions of the problem. 
Clearly, we need more information and more ﬁ rst-hand, eyewitness reporting 
from places like Darfur. We need to hear more and different voices. But how 
can we make that happen? Who moves the media? And what is ‘the media’ 
anyway? How can we talk coherently about such a disparate, diverse group of 
commercial and state enterprises that differ vastly across continents? Media 
organizations are populated by individual journalists, editors, media executives 
and others. More broadly speaking, ‘the media’ includes anyone who can apply 
some code of professional standards and disseminate news and information. 
So is it even realistic to look for discernible patterns of coverage in the media 
with an eye to recommending a different course of action?
And yet, some simple truths seem to be borne out by the evidence, and one 
of those truths is that media coverage does matter. There is a vast literature on 
how media coverage inﬂ uences or is interwoven with foreign policy decisions: 
either directly through the provision of information that ignites public opinion 
(the so-called ‘CNN effect’) or indirectly through what Bernard Cohen (1963) 
described as the media’s remarkable agenda-setting power to instruct people 
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as to what they should be thinking about. Others have suggested that media 
inﬂ uence is most likely to occur when policy is uncertain and media coverage is 
critically framed and empathizes with suffering people. But when policymakers 
have made up their minds and a policy track has been chosen, the news media 
can have much less inﬂ uence (Robinson 2000: 614). We probably can’t resolve 
the debate over whether media reports prod decision-makers into action or 
simply manufacture consent, but there can be no disagreement about the fact 
that more coverage of  an issue or a region is more likely to generate policy 
action than less coverage (for more on this, consult Robinson 2002 and Wanta 
et al. 2004). 
Media coverage, or lack of it, also matters in the inverse. The media glare 
of  the big story casts a deep shadow on its fringes. Some argue that rather 
than seeking to measure the impact of media coverage, we should pay more 
attention to the ‘nether world of absence of news’ (Sonwalkar 2004: 207) and 
what happens when the news media methodically downplay or ignore a story.
The crux of the Rwanda piece is that more extensive media coverage might 
have made a difference, might have pushed international actors to do something 
in the spring of 1994. Roméo Dallaire argues that media coverage of Rwanda 
never gained momentum during the genocide, never reached the kind of critical 
mass needed to move leaders. That momentum only emerged in July 1994, when 
media descended in droves to cover the plight of  those living in the refugee 
camps in Goma and sparked an international response. 
We keep asking ourselves, why did the news media clamber to cover Biafra 
in 1968, Ethiopia in 1984, Somalia in 1992–93, but not the Rwanda genocide? 
And why have news media systematically downplayed events in Sudan for the 
past two decades and virtually ignored other locales (Livingston 1996)?
Could the answer be that ‘the media’, writ large, the ‘cyclops’ as some have 
called it (Bierbauer 1994), can only focus its gaze on one major story at a time? 
And in choosing such stories, are journalists more likely to seize on a simple, 
dramatic storyline, featuring good and evil, without the complexities of ethnicity 
and power politics to clutter the narrative?
According to analysis of 200 English-language newspapers worldwide, the 
2004 tsunami in South East Asia generated more column inches in six weeks 
than the world’s top ten ‘forgotten’ emergencies combined over the previous 
year (IFRC 2005). The media blitz prompted unprecedented generosity. By 
February 2005, the international community had donated US$ 500 for every 
person affected by the tsunami, compared with just 50 cents for each person 
affected by Uganda’s 18-year war (IFRC 2005). Why did the tsunami and 
the subsequent relief  efforts generate so many headlines? There was a simple 
storyline – a natural disaster. There were no complex political relationships to 
explain. And even though events were unfolding on the other side of the world, 
the tsunami met some ‘proximity’ criteria for Western news editors because 
many Western tourists were involved.
In World Disasters Report 2005, the International Federation of Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Societies put it bluntly: ‘Editors sort stories by death tolls. 
Disasters that are unusual yet explicable, and that cause considerable death or 
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destruction in accessible places which the audience is believed to care about, get 
covered. Bafﬂ ing stories get less attention’ (IFRC 2005). Rwanda was a bafﬂ ing 
story, as is Darfur. As the Red Cross points out, news can be driven by ratings 
and circulation. So TV news is part news and part entertainment. No surprise 
then that ‘sudden, dramatic disasters like volcanoes or tsunamis are intensely 
newsworthy, whereas long-drawn-out crises (difﬁ cult to describe, let alone ﬁ lm) 
are not.’ By that score, the estimated 3.8 million deaths in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo since 1998 from war, disease and malnutrition have generated 
scant media coverage. But the dramatic eruption of the Nyiragongo volcano 
near Goma in early 2002 sparked an inﬂ ux of journalists, even though it killed 
fewer than 100 people. 
But when the cyclops turns its ‘monocular gaze’, the news media can become 
a major humanitarian actor, particularly, as Piers Robinson (2000) points out, 
when decision-makers are uncertain how to proceed. But that media role is 
very ill-deﬁ ned and hard to predict with any degree of certainty. That is in part 
because the media are no less complex as an institution than government or 
humanitarian organizations. And yet, most studies treat the news media as a 
monolithic actor (Minear et al. 1994: 31). As Minear and colleagues suggest, 
rather than seeing the media as an actor with a purpose, it is probably more 
instructive to see the media as an institution with a process. And that process is 
inclined toward gatekeeping principles regarding what is news and what is not, 
what warrants the cost of news coverage and is likely to garner the interest of the 
audience (Chang and Lee 1992). And often, media attention to one emergency 
comes at the expense of another. The devastating earthquake in Pakistan in 
the autumn of 2005 overshadowed coverage of the hurricane and mudslides in 
Guatemala, just as, in some ways, Michael Jackson overshadowed Darfur.
And ironically, the 24-hour news cycle, rather than leading to more in-depth, 
comprehensive reporting, has arguably driven coverage in the other direction 
– toward ﬂ eeting, episodic encounters with events outside our daily lives. That 
makes the news media a bad early warning system. As journalists, we seem to 
be best at recording and reporting conﬂ ict once it has reached a certain pitch, 
by acting as witnesses to genocide and other atrocities. The economics of the 
news business is a key factor here. Although it would seem to make sense to 
go where the news is about to happen, to get ahead of the story, we are more 
likely to go where the news is happening, where conﬂ ict has broken out. It is a 
sure bet; you’re not going to buy a plane ticket and end up with no story. Not 
much preventive value there. Journalists react to the same impulses as political 
decision-makers, and conﬂ icts often show up on journalists’ radar screen at 
about the same time as that of the decision-makers and diplomats – or more 
likely much later.
Not surprisingly, journalists largely reﬂ ect the societies in which they live and 
share the same ambivalence toward what is going on outside their borders, the 
same focus on domestic issues and selected international issues that are deemed 
to be relevant. In my view, it is up to individual journalists to crawl outside 
their skin, to get beyond that domestic focus and to exercise their role fully. Just 
as nation states have begrudgingly acknowledged the Responsibility to Protect
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– driven by the simple realization that we have a responsibility to others – I 
think journalists, as individuals, must accept the responsibility to report.
I suppose my simple point is that we’ve been lamenting for three decades 
how ‘the media’ fail to cover stories like Rwanda and Darfur. I echo the lament, 
which is backed up by a stream of qualitative and quantitative research. But 
normative prescriptions for what ‘the media’ should be doing differently have 
little application. Could it be that everyone is going about it the wrong way, 
looking top-down at the media, which is an amorphous, disparate beast anyway, 
when they should be looking from the ground up, at individual journalists and 
the role they can play?
British journalist-cum-politician Martin Bell (1998) has spoken about 
the ‘journalism of  attachment’, a call for empathy with humanity among 
journalists, something that some regard as an affront to the classical notion of 
journalistic objectivity and neutrality. But surely journalists can talk about an 
ethic of responsibility, a responsibility to report on people, places and events 
that have been excluded from the agenda of news organizations for a myriad 
of reasons. Surely individual journalists can try to make a difference, even if  
news organizations and the media are unable or unwilling to fully exercise 
their role. 
Journalists such as Nicholas Kristof of The New York Times and Sudarsan 
Raghavan – now with the Washington Post and formerly Africa correspondent 
for Knight Ridder – have made it their mission to keep the Darfur story on the 
world’s radar screen. They have demonstrated that individual journalists can 
make a difference. Canadian journalist Stephanie Nolen, Africa correspondent 
for the Globe and Mail newspaper, has single-handedly kept the issue of HIV/
AIDS on the Canadian agenda through dogged, persistent reporting on a 
scourge that is decimating Africa in its own kind of  genocide. In my own 
way, during 17 years as a reporter with the Toronto Star – Canada’s largest 
circulation daily newspaper – I made every effort to use my position to interest 
the newspaper’s powerful editors in stories that were not immediately on their 
radar screen, stories that took me on assignment to such places as Rwanda, 
Somalia, Sierra Leone and Kazakhstan. My personal interest and sense of 
responsibility as a journalist were shaped by a seminal experience in the early 
1990s, when a development organization saw ﬁ t to invest in me and ﬁ nanced a 
media internship that took me to Africa for an extended period. 
Since then, at every opportunity I have urged development assistance 
agencies, government and nongovernmental organizations, and advocates 
interested in media coverage of  the developing world to invest in individual 
journalists – those new to the profession and also veterans – by endowing 
research grants, fellowships and awards that make it possible for journalists 
to visit the developing world or to explore areas that otherwise fall into that 
nether world of media absence. In my experience, journalists exposed to the 
developing world want to go back again and again. And their reporting can 
make a difference.5
In the carnage in Rwanda in 1994, individual journalists tried to fulﬁ l their 
mandate, even though they were constrained by the chaos and the world’s 
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indifference. Thomas Kamilindi, who quit his job at Radio Rwanda on the eve 
of the genocide, wrote in this collection of his attempts to reach the outside 
world from his hiding place in the Milles Collines Hotel. Kamilindi kept trying 
the phone lines until he could get on the air and describe what was happening 
on the streets of  Kigali. One of  the attempts on Kamilindi’s life came after 
he managed to get through to radio colleagues in France and describe the 
atrocities in Rwanda. Imagine the impact if  journalists of good conscience, like 
Kamilindi, had been able to publish blogs in 1994, to circumvent the media 
inertia of budgets, racism and competing news interests. 
Another Rwandan journalist, whose identity remains unknown, managed 
to capture on videotape some of  the atrocities in the streets of  Kigali. The 
journalist, believed to have been a camera operator with Rwandan television 
at the time, travelled with a group of Interahamwe through the streets of Kigali 
at some point in April 1994. According to one report, the camera operator 
had apparently befriended members of  the death squads, even though he 
was opposed to the killing. As a journalist, he took considerable risk to gain 
permission to ride with the death squads through the streets of Kigali, ﬁ lming 
some of the scenes and capturing rare footage that has become the mainstay 
of later documentary accounts of the genocide and a key part of the historical 
record (Hughes 1998). The world needs more journalists like Kamilindi and 
the unknown Rwandan TV camera operator.
The concept of media intervention to foster a more highly professional cadre 
of journalists in the developing world ﬂ ourished in the decade after the Rwanda 
genocide. In 2003, Ross Howard, an associate at the Vancouver-based Institute 
for Media, Policy and Civil Society (IMPACS) estimated that in the previous 
ten years, US$ 1 billion had been invested in media-related interventions in 
conﬂ ict-stressed societies. Howard (2003) pointed to the emerging belief  that 
news media may well be the most effective means of preventing war and conﬂ ict. 
Such media interventions abound. The Washington-based Search for Common 
Ground and its European counterpart operate radio studios in Burundi, Liberia 
and Sierra Leone, producing news, features, drama, music and speciality soap 
operas for social change as well as television productions. The organization also 
supports media training workshops in Africa, the Middle East and the Aegean 
region. The Panos network of organizations works to stimulate debate around 
key development issues, in part through a media programme. The network 
includes ofﬁ ces in the Caribbean, Eastern Africa, London, Paris, South Asia, 
Southern Africa, Washington DC and West Africa, with a combined staff  of 
well over 100 people. Vancouver-based IMPACS supports programmes to foster 
free, responsible, independent media in emerging democracies by enhancing the 
contribution of the media to democratic development, good governance and 
public sector accountability. The Soros Foundation’s Open Society Institute, 
the London-based Institute for War and Peace Reporting and others are also 
active in vital media training. 
We need more voices, more ﬁ rst-hand accounts of events from journalists in 
the North and the South. Technology makes the arguments about newsroom 
budgets increasingly less relevant. Simply put, it is much, much cheaper to travel 
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to the developing world and do journalism than it used to be. And why not use 
more locally based correspondents as well? Isn’t it about time that Western news 
organizations re-examined their assumption that visiting foreign correspondents 
are of more value than locally based journalists?
One need look no further than the body of work of journalists like Sorious 
Samura, the documentary ﬁ lm-maker originally from Sierra Leone who has 
made it his mission to tell African stories. Samura’s very personal and engaged 
form of journalism has resulted in documentaries broadcast widely in North 
America and Europe on such topics as the atrocities of Sierra Leone’s civil war, 
the real stories of people living with hunger in Ethiopia, the plight of refugees 
in Darfur, the exodus of migrants through North Africa and the scourge of 
HIV/AIDS in a country like Zambia. Samura’s work is powerful and emotional 
stuff. But it also far exceeds the professional threshold for broadcast to an 
international audience. Surely he is not the only journalist in Africa capable 
of producing top-quality material for a Northern audience.
And Africans don’t just need to tell their stories to the outside world. They 
need to tell them to each other. For decades, London-based Gemini News 
Service pioneered the notion of  South–South journalism, maintaining a 
network of  journalists in the developing world. These local correspondents 
ﬁ led their copy to Gemini’s London ofﬁ ce, where it was edited, packaged and 
transmitted through Gemini to be published elsewhere in the developing world. 
Gemini broke the cycle of dependence that previously forced many Southern 
news outlets to see themselves through stories written by reporters from the 
North. And in turn, Gemini News Service provided some news organizations 
in the developed world – such as The Toronto Star and Southam News Service 
in Canada – with a steady stream of quality news features written by authors 
based in the developing world. One of Gemini’s most innovative projects was a 
village reporting exercise that saw more than 15 reporters from such countries 
as India, Sri Lanka, Fiji and Lesotho head off  to spend two months living in 
a village to report on daily life.
Gemini was truly a pioneer in recruiting and cultivating homegrown 
journalists and using them as correspondents to report on matters of interest 
to developing countries. Gemini’s founder, former Daily Mail journalist Derek 
Ingram, always objected to the notion that he was running an alternative news 
agency. He wanted Gemini to be regarded as a mainstream source of  copy 
that would also appeal to newspapers in the developed world (for an excellent 
history of  Gemini News Service, see Bourne 1995). Along the way, Gemini 
served as a springboard for legions of promising young journalists from the 
developing world as well as a generation of young Canadians who worked at 
the news agency through fellowships funded by the International Development 
Research Centre.6 Sadly, Gemini struggled for years to be ﬁ nancially viable and 
ﬁ nally closed its doors in 2003 after nearly 30 years in operation. Perhaps it is 
time for an agency like Gemini News Service to be reborn.
Other individual journalists are joining forces to try to make innovative use of 
new technology and web-based information platforms to bring the stories of the 
developing world to a wider audience. Early in this century, news consumers were 
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introduced to the ‘blog’, short for weblog. These online journals by individual 
writers usually consist of frequently updated commentaries, posted to a World 
Wide Web address. Now, millions of bloggers are sharing their opinions with 
a global audience in postings that combine content drawn from mainstream 
media and the web. As Daniel Drezner and Henry Farrell (2004) suggest in a 
recent paper, ‘What began as a hobby is evolving into a new medium that is 
changing the landscape for journalists and policymakers alike.’
Drezner and Farrell argue that blogs are gaining more inﬂ uence over the 
content of international media coverage, primarily through their agenda-setting 
function and by focusing on new or neglected issues. ‘Increasingly, journalists 
and pundits take their cues about “what matters” in the world from weblogs. For 
salient topics in global affairs, the blogosphere functions as a rare combination 
of  distributed expertise, real-time collective response to breaking news, and 
public-opinion barometer,’ they write. 
And television networks, with their notoriously top-heavy news operations, 
have begun to deploy ‘video journalists’, or VJs, individual journalists who 
carry small hand-held cameras and shoot and edit their own material. The work 
of some of these VJs is akin to a televised blog, with a mainstream connection. 
In Canada, the national broadcaster, CBC-Television, has deployed video 
journalist Saša Petricic in this way. Another such effort is the International 
Reporting Project at the Johns Hopkins University School of  Advanced 
International Studies (see the International Reporting Project website at 
<www.journalismfellowships.org/>). The group proposes a new programme 
concept for international news, an approach designed to bypass current 
distribution systems and build a new audience. The project aims to produce a 
new international news series using small teams of video journalists to explore 
an array of political, economic, health and cultural issues in a given country 
each month. The plan is to produce content for multiple platforms – including 
television, the Internet, DVDs, print and radio – and to promote it aggressively. 
For its part, Carleton University has expanded its Rwanda Initiative to include 
a media internship programme for Canadian journalism students who want to 
do work terms with a news organization in Africa. The initiative is also helping 
student journalists in Rwanda to produce freelance material for an outside 
audience.
It is difﬁ cult to fashion a strategy to deal with the structural ﬂ aws in the news 
media that resulted in the failure to provide adequate coverage of the Rwanda 
genocide or the crisis in Darfur. But surely that difﬁ culty should not prevent 
us from trying to change the structure one small piece at a time, through the 
work of individual journalists. This is a rallying cry to those who call themselves 
journalists, who practise this profession. Rwandan journalist Thomas Kamilindi 
recounts an encounter he had in Côte d’Ivoire with a group of young reporters 
who wondered how to avoid being drawn into the hate media in their country. 
Kamilindi’s admonition was simple: stand up and be reporters, do your job. He 
is echoed by Roméo Dallaire, who reminds journalists that they can be powerful 
individually and collectively and must stay dynamic in the search for truth. As 
Maxwell McCombs notes in a recent review of the literature on media agenda-
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setting, the space on the media agenda and public attention to that agenda 
are both rare commodities. ‘Setting the agenda is an awesome responsibility,’ 
McCombs (2005: 556) concludes. ‘Arguably the most fundamental, overarching 
ethical question for journalists concerns their stewardship of these resources.’ 
This collection of papers ends on a simple note, a plea to journalists: do your 
job, use the power that this profession affords and take up your responsibilities, 
starting with the responsibility to report.
NOTES
1. United Nations Secretary General Koﬁ  Annan used remarks to a 26 March 2004 memorial 
conference on the genocide, held at the UN headquarters in New York, to declare that he 
personally should have done more to ‘sound the alarm and rally support’, for Rwanda; Bill 
Clinton used the 25 March 1998 speech in Kigali to acknowledge that the international 
community must bear its share of responsibility for the genocide, didn’t act quickly enough and 
did not call the crimes by their rightful name: genocide; Roméo Dallaire has stated on numerous 
occasions since 1994 that he feels he failed personally to fulﬁ l his mission in Rwanda.
2. The author took part in a 25 May 2004 roundtable discussion in London, conducted under 
Chatham House rules of  non-attribution, during which the BBCM tension and hate speech 
project was described in detail. The roundtable – Hate speech, incitement and conﬂ ict: can 
media monitoring help prevent violence? – was organized by Oxford University’s Programme 
in Comparative Media Law and Policy.
3. The remark was made by one of the participants in the May 2004, London roundtable.
4. Research compiled by the American Progress Action Fund, which operates the BeAWitness.org 
website. Research for the June 2005 analysis was conducted using the TVEyes media tracking 
service <www.TVEyes.com>.
5. For example, the author made this argument in testimony before the Senate Standing Committee 
on Transport and Communications on 1 December 2004, in the context of  the committee’s 
examination of the current state of the news media in Canada (Senate 2004). 
6. The author took up one of IDRC’s Gemini internships in 1990–91 and worked as a copy-editor 
and writer at Gemini for eight months in addition to making a ﬁ ve-month ﬁ eld trip to North 
Africa to examine the ﬂ edgling Arab Maghreb Union. The time at Gemini was a formative 
experience.
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